Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):774-775 (1997)

Abstract
In many base rate studies, a judgment is required for which the base rates are relevant, and subjects do not use them. It is inferred that the base rates are ignored; I question this inference. Second, I argue that the base rate fallacy is not less significant for what it reveals about human reasoning, if it occurs less frequently than has been alleged.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x97221643
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