Legal Theory 6 (4):337-389 (2000)
AbstractCan constitutional rights be both personal and rule-dependent? Can it be true of constitutional adjudication (1) that a constitutional litigant must assert rights, and yet also (2) that the viability of a constitutional challenge depends (or sometimes depends) on whether a particular type of legal rule, for example, a discriminatory or poorly tailored rule, is in force?
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