The problem of confirmation in the Everett interpretation

Abstract
I argue that the Oxford school Everett interpretation is internally incoherent, because we cannot claim that in an Everettian universe the kinds of reasoning we have used to arrive at our beliefs about quantum mechanics would lead us to form true beliefs. I show that in an Everettian context, the experimental evidence that we have available could not provide empirical confirmation for quantum mechanics, and moreover that we would not even be able to establish reference to the theoretical entities of quantum mechanics. I then consider a range of existing Everettian approaches to the probability problem and show that they do not succeed in overcoming this incoherence
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsb.2014.03.004
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References found in this work BETA

Minds, Brains and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
The Relevance of Self-Locating Beliefs.Michael Titelbaum - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):555-606.

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Citations of this work BETA

Everettian Quantum Mechanics and Physical Probability: Against the Principle of “State Supervenience”.Lina Jansson - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 53:45-53.

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