Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (4):522-551 (1998)
Karl Popper's methodology can be seen as the situational logic of research. Popper called his method "Epistemology without a Knowing Subject." It was dismissed as metaphysical by those who refuse to give up an ideal knowing subject (a perfect human inductive processor). This article surveys the failure of modem discussions of this ideal, from the earliest (the writings of Sir Francis Bacon) to the latest (Kripke). The knowing subject exits at last, but leaves behind interesting results. The ideal knowing subject embodied ideal rationality, outside culture and history. Giving up this ideal invites us to integrate science with its background, to grade rationality (from magic to science), and to integrate different degrees of rationality under one rule.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ryle and Oakeshott on the “Knowing-How/Knowing-That” Distinction.Leslie Marsh - 2010 - In Corey Abel (ed.), The Meanings of Michael Oakeshott's Conservatism.
The Metaepistemology of Knowing-How.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):541-556.
Rethinking Polanyi's Concept of Tacit Knowledge: From Personal Knowing to Imagined Institutions. [REVIEW]Tim Ray - 2009 - Minerva 47 (1):75-92.
Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do.Refeng Tang - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.
Popper's World 3 & Human Creativity.Zuzana Parusnikova - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):263 – 269.
Popper's Conception of the Rationality Principle in the Social Sciences.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2006 - In Ian Jarvie, David Miller & Karl Milford (eds.), Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment: Selected Papers from Karl Popper 2002: Volume III: Science. Ashgate.
Popper, Rationality and the Possibility of Social Science.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Theoria 28 (1):61-75.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads24 ( #209,498 of 2,164,236 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #348,017 of 2,164,236 )
How can I increase my downloads?