On the irrationality of mind-uploading: a rely to Neil Levy [Book Review]

AI and Society 27 (4):431-436 (2012)
Authors
Nick Agar
Victoria University of Wellington
Abstract
In a paper in this journal, Neil Levy challenges Nicholas Agar’s argument for the irrationality of mind-uploading. Mind-uploading is a futuristic process that involves scanning brains and recording relevant information which is then transferred into a computer. Its advocates suppose that mind-uploading transfers both human minds and identities from biological brains into computers. According to Agar’s original argument, mind-uploading is prudentially irrational. Success relies on the soundness of the program of Strong AI—the view that it may someday be possible to build a computer that is capable of thought. Strong AI may in fact be false, an eventuality with dire consequences for mind-uploading. Levy argues that Agar’s argument relies on mistakes about the probability of failed mind-uploading and underestimates what is to be gained from successfully mind-uploading. This paper clarifies Agar’s original claims about the likelihood of mind-uploading failure and offers further defense of a pessimistic evaluation of success
Keywords Mind-uploading  Strong AI  Pascal’s Wager
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DOI 10.1007/s00146-011-0333-7
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References found in this work BETA

Minds, Brains and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Pascal's Wager.Alan Hájek - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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