AI and Society 27 (4):431-436 (2012)
In a paper in this journal, Neil Levy challenges Nicholas Agar’s argument for the irrationality of mind-uploading. Mind-uploading is a futuristic process that involves scanning brains and recording relevant information which is then transferred into a computer. Its advocates suppose that mind-uploading transfers both human minds and identities from biological brains into computers. According to Agar’s original argument, mind-uploading is prudentially irrational. Success relies on the soundness of the program of Strong AI—the view that it may someday be possible to build a computer that is capable of thought. Strong AI may in fact be false, an eventuality with dire consequences for mind-uploading. Levy argues that Agar’s argument relies on mistakes about the probability of failed mind-uploading and underestimates what is to be gained from successfully mind-uploading. This paper clarifies Agar’s original claims about the likelihood of mind-uploading failure and offers further defense of a pessimistic evaluation of success
|Keywords||Mind-uploading Strong AI Pascal’s Wager|
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References found in this work BETA
The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature.Martha Craven Nussbaum - 1990 - Oxford University Press.
Humanity's End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement.Nicholas Agar - 2010 - Bradford.
Citations of this work BETA
Life in Overabundance: Agar on Life-Extension and the Fear of Death.Aveek Bhattacharya & Robert Mark Simpson - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):223-236.
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