The Heuristic Bent

Philosophy and Rhetoric 26 (1):9 - 30 (1993)
The logic of questions is still very limited; there is a need for a specification of what is a problem, and what is a problem-situation — or what is an adequate solution to a problem in a given situation. A problem may seek its wording, and so may do the adequacy conditions or desiderata for its solution. For the inarticulate, there is no distinction between theoretical and practical problems. Their problem is a goal, the situation is the available routes to it, and no adequac y conditions.
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