Philosophical Studies 28 (4):289 - 294 (1975)
The pair democreteanism-Platonism (nothing/something is outside space-Time) differs from the pair nominalism-Realism (universals are/are not nameable entities). Nominalism need not be democretean, And democreateanism is nominalist only if conceptualism is rejected. Putnam's critique of nominalism is thus invalid. Quine's theory is democretean-When-Possible: quine is also a minimalist platonist. Conceptualists and realists agree that universals exist but not as physical objects. Nominalists accept universals only as "facons de parler"
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A Leśniewskian Re-Examination of Goodman's Nominalistic Rejection of Classes.Judith M. Prakel - 1983 - Topoi 2 (1):87-98.
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