Ethics 125 (4):1096-1113 (2015)

Julie Tannenbaum
Pomona College
We discuss applications of our account of moral status grounded in person-rearing relationships: which individuals have higher moral status or not, and why? We cover three classes of cases: (1) cases involving incomplete realization of the capacity to care, including whether infants or fetuses have this incomplete capacity; (2) cases in which higher moral status rests in part on what is required for the being to flourish; (3) hypothetical cases in which cognitive enhancements could, e.g., help dogs achieve human-like cognitive capacities. We thereby show that our account does not have the counterintuitive implications alleged by DeGrazia and other critics.
Keywords moral status  rearing relationship  capacity
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DOI 10.1086/680905
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On Being Attached.Monique Wonderly - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):223-242.

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Cognitive Disability and Moral Status.David Wasserman - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Problem with Person‐Rearing Accounts of Moral Status.Travis Timmerman & Bob Fischer - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):119-128.

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