Epistemic Paternalism: A Defence

Palgrave-Macmillan (2013)
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Abstract
We know that we are fallible creatures, liable to cognitive bias. But we also have a strong and stubborn tendency to overestimate our reasoning capacities. This presents a problem for any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways: While we might see the point of others heeding intellectual advice and relying on reasoning aids, each and every one of us will tend not to see the point of doing so ourselves. The present book argues that the solution to this problem lies in accepting a form of epistemic paternalism. Accepting such paternalism is to accept that we are sometimes justified in interfering with the inquiry of another without her consent but for her own epistemic good. Because when it comes to our freedom to conduct inquiry in whatever way we see fit, more is not always better. In fact, less is often more.
Keywords Social Epistemology  Paternalism
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Call number B820.3.A55 2013
ISBN(s) 9780230347892  
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The Heteronomy of Choice Architecture.Chris Mills - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):495-509.
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