Philosophical Studies 166 (2):329-347 (2013)

Authors
Stephen Grimm
Fordham University
Abstract
Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of “getting it right.” The idea then developed is that accuracy is a genus with several species. Believing truly is a prominent species, but it is not the only one. Finally, it is argued that accuracy monism is equally good or better than both traditional truth monism and its main dialectical rival, value pluralism, when it comes to satisfying three important axiological desiderata
Keywords Epistemology  Value  Epistemic value  Epistemic goal
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0038-x
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References found in this work BETA

Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Beyond Explanation: Understanding as Dependency Modeling.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (4):1261-1286.
Is Knowledge of Causes Sufficient for Understanding?Xingming Hu - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):291-313.
All Swamping, No Problem.Joseph Bjelde - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):205-211.
The Value of Knowledge.Carter J. Adam, Pritchard Duncan & Turri John - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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