Intuitions in epistemology: Towards a naturalistic alternative

Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):15-34 (2009)
Abstract
The present paper revisits the main methodological problems with conceptual analysis and considers two attempts to rectify them in terms of prototypes and reflective equilibria, respectively. Finding both wanting for the purposes of epistemological analysis, a naturalistic alternative is then sketched that explores the positive implications of aforementioned problems for the demarcation of the respective roles of intuitions and empirical investigation within three epistemological domains, viz., the evaluation of epistemological hypotheses, the amelioration of epistemic practices, and the construction of a theory of epistemic value.
Keywords Methodology  Intuitions  Conceptual analysis
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DOI 10.12697/spe.2009.2.2.02
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