Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):111-131 (2010)

Authors
Arif Ahmed
Cambridge University
Abstract
Sophisticated ‘tickle’-style defences of Evidential Decision Theory take your motivational state to screen off your act from any state that is causally independent of it, thus ensuring that EDT and CDT converge. That leads to unacceptable instability in cases in which the correct action is obvious. We need a more liberal conception of what the agent controls. It follows that an ordinary deliberator should sometimes consider the past and not only the future to be subject to her present choice.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00281.x
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References found in this work BETA

Subjective Probability: The Real Thing.Richard C. Jeffrey - 2002 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
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