Causal Decision Theory and EPR correlations

Synthese 191 (18):4315-4352 (2014)

Authors
Arif Ahmed
Cambridge University
Abstract
The paper argues that on three out of eight possible hypotheses about the EPR experiment we can construct novel and realistic decision problems on which (a) Causal Decision Theory and Evidential Decision Theory conflict (b) Causal Decision Theory and the EPR statistics conflict. We infer that anyone who fully accepts any of these three hypotheses has strong reasons to reject Causal Decision Theory. Finally, we extend the original construction to show that anyone who gives any of the three hypotheses any non-zero credence has strong reasons to reject Causal Decision Theory. However, we concede that no version of the Many Worlds Interpretation (Vaidman, in Zalta, E.N. (ed.), Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 2014) gives rise to the conflicts that we point out
Keywords Bell’s theorem  Decision Theory  Counterfactuals  Many worlds interpretation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0536-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.D. Lewis - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):403-405.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.

View all 52 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-05-22

Total views
398 ( #12,643 of 2,260,165 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
45 ( #16,422 of 2,260,165 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature