Authors |
|
Abstract |
Causal Decision Theory reckons the choice-worthiness of an option to be completely independent of its evidential bearing on its non-effects. But after one has made a choice this bearing is relevant to future decisions. Therefore it is possible to construct problems of sequential choice in which Causal Decision Theory makes a guaranteed loss. So Causal Decision Theory is wrong. The source of the problem is the idea that agents have a special perspective on their own contemplated actions, from which evidential connections that observers can see are either irrelevant or invisible.
|
Keywords | Causal Decision Theory Sequential Choice |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Pitfalls for Realistic Decision Theory: An Illustration From Sequential Choice.José Luis Bermúdez - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):23-40.
Preference Stability and Substitution of Indifferents: A Rejoinder to Seidenfeld.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (4):311-318.
Rational Choice and Expected Utility.Reed Brannon Richter - 1985 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
Impartiality and Causal Decision Theory.Brad Armendt - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:326 - 336.
What Are the Minimal Requirements of Rational Choice? Arguments From the Sequential-Decision Setting.Katie Siobhan Steele - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):463-487.
Lost Memories and Useless Coins: Revisiting the Absentminded Driver.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):3011-3036.
Decision Theory, Philosophical Perspectives.Darren Bradley - 2013 - In Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage Publications.
Review of McLennen *Rationality and Dynamic Choice*. [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):381-383.
Causal Decision Theory and EPR Correlations.Arif Ahmed & Adam Caulton - 2014 - Synthese 191 (18):4315-4352.
Causal Decision Theory.Ellery Eells - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:177 - 200.
Egan and Agents: How Evidential Decision Theory Can Deal with Egan’s Dilemma.Daniel Dohrn - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1883-1908.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2018-03-27
Total views
214 ( #41,736 of 2,402,079 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
74 ( #9,255 of 2,402,079 )
2018-03-27
Total views
214 ( #41,736 of 2,402,079 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
74 ( #9,255 of 2,402,079 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads