Sequential Choice and the Agent's Perspective

Abstract

Causal Decision Theory reckons the choice-worthiness of an option to be completely independent of its evidential bearing on its non-effects. But after one has made a choice this bearing is relevant to future decisions. Therefore it is possible to construct problems of sequential choice in which Causal Decision Theory makes a guaranteed loss. So Causal Decision Theory is wrong. The source of the problem is the idea that agents have a special perspective on their own contemplated actions, from which evidential connections that observers can see are either irrelevant or invisible.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Rationality revisited.Reed Richter - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):392 – 403.
Interventionist decision theory.Reuben Stern - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4133-4153.
Rational Choice and Expected Utility.Reed Brannon Richter - 1985 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
Impartiality and Causal Decision Theory.Brad Armendt - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:326 - 336.
Decision and Intervention.Reuben Stern - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):783-804.
Actualist rationality.Charles F. Manski - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (2):195-210.
Causal Decision Theory.Ellery Eells - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:177 - 200.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-03-27

Downloads
467 (#31,796)

6 months
87 (#28,763)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Arif Ahmed
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references