Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):436-455 (2007)
In his essay "Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleosemantics with an Input Condition" (this issue) Nicholas Shea argues, with support from the work of Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996), that teleosemantics, as David Papinau and I have articulated it, cannot explain why "content attribution can be used to explain successful behavior." This failure is said to result from defining the intentional contents of representations by reference merely to historically normal conditions for success of their "outputs," that is, of their uses by interpreting or consuming mechanisms, bypassing the more traditional focus, of those who would naturalize intentional content, on causal or informational inputs. Shea proposes to "add an input condition to teleosemantics," requiring that simple representations must carry "correlational information." I am grateful to Shea for his paper, as it presents me with an opportunity to clarify two fairly central features of my position on intentional content, one of which seems to have been overlooked in the literature (Millikan 1993a), the other of which I have stated previously only in a confusing way (Millikan 2004, Chapters 3-4). The first clarification concerns the general form that I take explanation by reference to intentional states to have. The second concerns my description of "locally recurrent natural information," why this kind of information is needed in place of Shea's "correlational information" to explain what feeds simple representational systems, and why no reference to natural information is needed to account for the success of behaviors by reference to the truth of representations that motivate them
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy of Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories.Ruth G. Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.
Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice.Ruth G. Millikan - 1993 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Information as a Probabilistic Difference Maker.Andrea Scarantino - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):419-443.
Teleosemantics, Infotel-Semantics and Circularity.Marc Artiga - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):583-603.
Against “Soft” Statistical Information.Daniel M. Kraemer - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):139-147.
Prospects for Probabilistic Theories of Natural Information.Ulrich E. Stegmann - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):869-893.
Similar books and articles
Underqualified—Maximal Generality in Darwinian Explanation: A Response to Matt Gers.Geoffrey M. Hodgson & Thorbjørn Knudsen - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (4):607-614.
Science Fictions: Comment on Godfrey-Smith.Arthur Fine - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (1):117 - 125.
Book Review:Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature Peter Godfrey-Smith. [REVIEW]Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (2):375-.
Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays.Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Representation in the Genome and in Other Inheritance Systems.Nicholas Shea - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (3):313-331.
Metaethics, Teleosemantics and the Function of Moral Judgements.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (5):639-662.
Teleosemantics Without Natural Selection.Marshall Abrams - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):97-116.
Mental Representation, Naturalism, and Teleosemantics.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2004 - In David Papineau & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleosemantics with an Input Condition.Nicholas Shea - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):404-435.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads92 ( #53,261 of 2,146,261 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #162,891 of 2,146,261 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.