A Consistency Challenge for Moral and Religious Beliefs

Teaching Philosophy 32 (2):127-151 (2009)

Scott Aikin
Vanderbilt University
What should individuals do when their firmly held moral beliefs are prima facie inconsistent with their religious beliefs? In this article weoutline several ways of posing such consistency challenges and offer a detailed taxonomy of the various responses available to someone facing a consistency challenge of this sort. Throughout the paper, our concerns are primarily pedagogical: how best to pose consistency challenges in the classroom, how to stimulate discussion of the various responses to them, and how to relate such consistency challenges to larger issues, such as whether scripture is, in general, a reliable guide to truth
Keywords education  pedagogy  consistency  moral belief  religious belief
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/teachphil200932215
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Commands.Brian Ribeiro & Scott Aikin - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):77-96.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Student Philosophical Opinions: A Survey.Haskell Fain & E. F. Kaelin - 1960 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 3 (1-4):137 – 152.
Killing Traditions: Consistency in Applied Moral Philosophy.Lisa Kemmerer - 2004 - Ethics, Place and Environment 7 (3):151 – 171.
The Consistency Strength of an Infinitary Ramsey Property.George Kafkoulis - 1994 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (4):1158-1195.
Truth and Consistency.Jan Woleński - 2010 - Axiomathes 20 (2-3):347-355.
Coherentism and Justified Inconsistent Beliefs: A Solution.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41.


Added to PP index

Total views
248 ( #22,297 of 2,325,487 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #78,786 of 2,325,487 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature