Evidentialism and James' Argument from Friendship

Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):173-180 (2008)
Abstract
William James' main argument in “The Will to Believe” against evidentialism is that there are facts that cannot come to be without a preliminary faith in their coming. James primarily makes this case with the argument from friendship. I will critically present James' argument from friendship and show that the argument does not yield a counter-example to evidentialism and is in the end unsound.
Keywords Conference Proceedings  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0897-2346
DOI 10.5840/swphilreview200824133
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,220
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

139 ( #33,890 of 2,164,599 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #62,414 of 2,164,599 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums