Holding One's Own

Argumentation 22 (4):571-584 (2008)
There is a tension with regard to regulative norms of inquiry. One’s commitments must survive critical scrutiny, and if they do not survive, they should be revised. Alternately, for views to be adequately articulated and defended, their proponents must maintain a strong commitment to the views in question. A solution is proposed with the notion of holding one’s own as the virtue of being reason-responsive with the prospects of improving the view in question
Keywords Argumentative rules  Refutation  Tenacity  Falliblism
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DOI 10.1007/s10503-007-9066-7
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957). Intention. Harvard University Press.
Thomas Kelly (2005). The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.

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