Metaphilosophy 45 (2):172-181 (2014)

Authors
Scott Aikin
Vanderbilt University
Abstract
This article poses two regresses for justification of moral knowledge and discusses three models for moral epistemic infinitism that arise. There are moral infinitisms dependent on empirical infinitism, what are called “piggyback” moral infinitisms. There are substantive empiricist moral infinitisms, requiring infinite chains of descriptive facts to justify normative rules. These empiricist infinitisms are developed either as infinitist egoisms or as infinitist sentimentalisms. And, finally, there are substantive rationalist moral infinitisms, requiring infinite chains of normative reasons to justify moral rules. Rationalist moral infinitism is posed as a mixed view integrating moral intuitions with the demand for justifying reasons
Keywords regress problem  epistemic infinitism  moral knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/meta.12071
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References found in this work BETA

Rescuing Justice and Equality.G. A. Cohen (ed.) - 2008 - Harvard University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
Moral Skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Facts and Principles.G. A. Cohen - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (3):211-245.

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