Who is afraid of epistemology's regress problem?

Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191 - 217 (2005)
Abstract
  What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: (A) conceptual arguments from incompleteness, (B) conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, (C) ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and (D) ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of “infinitism” consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-7803-4
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References found in this work BETA
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
The Structure of Justification.Robert Audi - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
Knowledge and Justification.John Pollock - 1970 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Viciousness and the Structure of Reality.Ricki Bliss - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):399-418.
Prospects for A Levinasian Epistemic Infinitism.J. Aaron Simmons & Scott F. Aikin - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (3):437-460.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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