Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669 (2005)

Authors
Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark
Fred Adams
University of Delaware
Abstract
In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
Keywords Content  Derivation  Intentionality  Metaphysics  Original  Thought  Dennett, Daniel
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515080500355186
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,639
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Minds, Brains, and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Roots of Remembering: Radically Enactive Recollecting.Daniel D. Hutto & Anco Peeters - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 97-118.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
1,107 ( #2,968 of 2,331,390 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #194,788 of 2,331,390 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes