Defending non-derived content

Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669 (2005)

Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark
Fred Adams
University of Delaware
In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality. 1. Humans lack original intentionality. 2. Humans have derived intentionality only. 3. There is no distinction between original and derived intentionality. 4. There is no such thing as original intentionality. We argue that Dennett’s discussion fails to secure any of these conclusions for the contents of thoughts.
Keywords Original intensionality  Derived intensionality  Naturalized semantic  Dennett
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515080500355186
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 43,728
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Minds, Brains, and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Roots of Remembering: Radically Enactive Recollecting.Daniel D. Hutto & Anco Peeters - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 97-118.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Defending Non-Derived Content.Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
The Holy Grail of Cognitivism: A Response to Adams and Aizawa. [REVIEW]Richard Menary - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):605-618.
Naturalising Representational Content.Nicholas Shea - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):496-509.
Rights-Based Rights.Diana T. Meyers - 1984 - Law and Philosophy 3 (3):407 - 421.
The Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion.Frank Hindriks - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406.
Defending Affirmative Action, Defending Preferences.James P. Sterba - 2003 - Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (2):285–300.
Defending Wordsworth, Defending Poetry.Mark Edmundson - 1995 - Philosophy and Literature 19 (2):207-213.


Added to PP index

Total views
26 ( #331,293 of 2,264,682 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #610,433 of 2,264,682 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature