What is this cognition that is supposed to be embodied?

Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):755-775 (2015)

Authors
Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark
Abstract
Many cognitive scientists have recently championed the thesis that cognition is embodied. In principle, explicating this thesis should be relatively simple. There are, essentially, only two concepts involved: cognition and embodiment. After articulating what will here be meant by ‘embodiment’, this paper will draw attention to cases in which some advocates of embodied cognition apparently do not mean by ‘cognition’ what has typically been meant by ‘cognition’. Some advocates apparently mean to use ‘cognition’ not as a term for one, among many, causes of behavior, but for what has more often been called “behavior.” Some consequences for this proposal are considered
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2013.875280
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References found in this work BETA

The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Enactivist Revolution.Kenneth Aizawa - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):19-42.
Cognition and Behavior.Ken Aizawa - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4269-4288.
Embodied Cognition: Looking Inward.Przemysław Nowakowski - 2017 - Hybris. Revista de Filosofía 38:74-97.

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