Atilla Akalın
Istanbul Gelisim University
This study asserts that W.V.O. Quine’s eliminative philosophical gaze into mereological composition affects inevitably his interpretations of composition theories of ontology. To investigate Quine’s property monism from the account of modal eliminativism, I applied to his solution for the paradoxes of de re modalities’ . Because of its vital role to figure out how dispositions are encountered by Quine, it was significantly noted that the realm of de re modalities doesn’t include contingent and impossible inferences about things. Therefore, for him, all the intrinsic forces and elements of entities such as powers and causal or teleological dispositions for ontology demand to be seen necessarily as bound variables from a monist perspective. Although his denial of analyticity and the elimination of dispositional field of ontology, S. Mumford criticizes the monist perspective of Quine’s paradoxical approach to superveniences. Because superveniences create problems while determining type-type identities from a monist mereological perspective. It is observed that Quine faces with a reduction again in terms of his dispositional monism despite his critiques to repulse vagueness from the ontology in his well-known article Two Dogmas of Empiricism.
Keywords Ontology  Mereology  Metaphysics  W.V.O. Quine  S. Mumford  Modality  Supervenience
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Passing Powers Around.Stephen Mumford - 2009 - The Monist 92 (1):94-111.
The Role of Variables.Kit Fine - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (12):605-631.

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Citations of this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Passing Powers Around.Stephen Mumford - 2009 - The Monist 92 (1):94-111.
ModelTtheory for Modal Logic. Part I — The de Re/de Dicto Distinction.Kit Fine - 1978 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):125 - 156.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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