A deflationist approach to indeterminacy and vagueness

Philosophical Studies 107 (1):69 - 86 (2002)
Deflationists cannot make sense of the notion of referential indeterminacy because they deny the existence of substantive reference. One way for them to make sense of the objective existence of linguistic indeterminacy is by embracing the worldly (or objectual) view of indeterminacy, the view that indeterminacy exists not in reference relations but in the(non-linguistic) world itself. On this view, the entire world is divided into precisified worlds, just as it is divided into temporal slices and (arguably) alethic possible worlds. Supervaluationism proves to be neutral with respect to the debate between the worldly view and the referential view of indeterminacy.
Keywords Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1013155230291
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,831
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Vagueness in the World.Ken Akiba - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):407–429.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Deconstructing Ontological Vagueness.Matti Eklund - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):117-140.
Worldly Indeterminacy: A Rough Guide.Nicholas J. J. Smith & Gideon Rosen - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):185 – 198.
Schiffer on Vagueness.Matti Eklund - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):12–23.
Vagueness Without Ignorance.Cian Dorr - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):83–113.
Parts, Counterparts and Modal Occurents.Achille C. Varzi - 2001 - Travaux de Logique 14 (1):151-171.
Is Vagueness Sui Generis ?David Barnett - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5 – 34.
Vagueness as Indeterminacy.Brian Weatherson - 2010 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
65 ( #88,995 of 2,214,215 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #30,216 of 2,214,215 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature