Robert Kane, free will, and neuro-indeterminism

Philo 8 (2):95-108 (2005)

Abstract
In this paper I argue that Robert Kane’s defense of event-causal libertarianism, as presented in Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, fails because his event-causal reconstruction is incoherent. I focus on the notions of efforts and self-forming actions essential to his defense
Keywords Free Will  Indeterminism  Libertarianism  Metaphysics  Kane, Robert
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ISBN(s) 1098-3570
DOI 10.5840/philo2005823
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