SATS 18 (1):37-53 (2017)

Authors
Andreas Albertsen
Aarhus University
Abstract
The late G.A. Cohen is routinely considered a founding father of luck egalitarianism, a prominent responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. David Miller argues that Cohen’s considered beliefs on distributive justice are not best understood as luck egalitarian. While the relationship between distributive justice and personal responsibility plays an important part in Cohen’s work, Miller maintains that it should be considered an isolated theme confined to Cohen’s exchange with Dworkin. We should not understand the view Cohen defends in this exchange as Cohen’s considered view. Accepting this thesis would change both our understanding of Cohen’s political philosophy and many recent luck egalitarian contributions. Miller’s argument offers an opportunity to reassess Cohen’s writings as a whole. Ultimately, however, the textual evidence against Miller’s argument is overwhelming. Cohen clearly considers the exchange with Dworkin to be about egalitarianism as such rather than about the best responsibility-sensitive version of egalitarianism. Furthermore, Cohen often offers luck egalitarian formulations of his own view outside of the exchange with Dworkin and uses luck egalitarianism as an independent yardstick for evaluating principles and distributions.
Keywords luck egalitarianism  G.A. Cohen  distributive justice
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1515/sats-2017-0008
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,388
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.Richard J. Arneson - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):77 - 93.
Facts and Principles.G. A. Cohen - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (3):211-245.
Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):924-934.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Can Luck Egalitarianism Be Really Saved By Value Pluralism?Eugen Huzum - 2011 - Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Philosophia 2.
Luck Egalitarianism.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2015 - Bloomsbury Academic.
Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):924-934.
The Coherence of Luck Egalitarianism.Gideon Elford - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (3):617-626.
Hurley on Egalitarianism and the Luck-Neutralizing Aim.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2005 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (2):249-265.
The Incompleteness of Luck Egalitarianism.Ryan Long - 2011 - Social Philosophy Today 27:87-96.
Luck Egalitarianism, Permissible Inequalities, and Moral Hazard.Gerald Lang - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (3):317-338.
How Interesting is the “Boring Problem” for Luck Egalitarianism?Gerald Lang - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):698-722.
Luck, Institutions, and Global Distributive Justice.Kok-Chor Tan - 2011 - European Journal of Political Theory 10 (3):394-421.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-09-12

Total views
23 ( #470,937 of 2,445,481 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #185,500 of 2,445,481 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes