Witness-Consciousness: Its Definition, Appearance and Reality

Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):62-84 (2009)
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Abstract

G.E. Moore alludes to a notion of consciousness that is diaphanous, elusive to attention, yet detectable. Such a notion, I suggest, approximates what Bina Gupta has called `witness-consciousness'--in particular, the aspect of mode-neutral awareness with intrinsic phenomenal character. This paper offers a detailed definition and defence of the appearance and reality of witness-consciousness. While I claim that witness- consciousness captures the essence of subjectivity, and so must be accounted for in the `hard problem' of consciousness, it is not to be confused with the more commonly defended notion of `for-me-ness'

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Miri Albahari
University of Western Australia

Citations of this work

Pure awareness experience.Brentyn J. Ramm - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):394-416.
Minimal phenomenal experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.
Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Selfhood: a Reply to some Critics.Dan Zahavi - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):703-718.

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