On the logic of theory change: Contraction functions and their associated revision functions

Theoria 48 (1):14-37 (1982)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A study in the logic of theory change, examining the properties of maxichoice contraction and revision operations.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,592

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On the logic of theory change: Contraction without recovery. [REVIEW]Eduardo L. Fermé - 1998 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (2):127-137.
Resource-bounded belief revision and contraction.Mark Jago - 2006 - In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer. pp. 141--154.
Foundational belief change.Abhaya C. Nayak - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (5):495 - 533.
Comparative Possibility in Set Contraction.Pavlos Peppas - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):53-75.
Ranking Functions, AGM Style.Wolfgang Spohn - 1999 - Internet Festschrift for Peter Gärdenfors.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-13

Downloads
103 (#145,781)

6 months
9 (#119,718)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Makinson
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

Four Approaches to Supposition.Benjamin Eva, Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (26):58-98.
Nonmonotonic inference based on expectations.Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1994 - Artificial Intelligence 65 (2):197-245.
On the status of the postulate of recovery in the logic of theory change.David Makinson - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (4):383 - 394.

View all 101 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Subjunctives, dispositions and chances.Isaac Levi - 1977 - Synthese 34 (4):423 - 455.
An Epistemic Approach to Conditionals.Peter Gärdenfors - 1981 - American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (3):203 - 211.
A pragmatic approach to explanations.Peter Gärdenfors - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (3):404-423.

Add more references