An axiomatic version of Fitch's paradox

Synthese 190 (12):2015-2020 (2013)

Authors
Abstract
A variation of Fitch’s paradox is given, where no special rules of inference are assumed, only axioms. These axioms follow from the familiar assumptions which involve rules of inference. We show (by constructing a model) that by allowing that possibly the knower doesn’t know his own soundness (while still requiring he be sound), Fitch’s paradox is avoided. Provided one is willing to admit that sound knowers may be ignorant of their own soundness, this might offer a way out of the paradox
Keywords Knowledge  Epistemology  Knowability  Paradox  Fitch’s paradox
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9954-0
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,711
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts.Frederic B. Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-01-05

Total views
205 ( #30,345 of 2,328,402 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #279,894 of 2,328,402 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature