Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):571 – 583 (2008)
AbstractFirst-person reports are central to the study of subjective well-being in contemporary psychology, but there is much disagreement about exactly what sort of first-person reports should be used. This paper examines an influential proposal to replace all first-person reports of life satisfaction with introspective reports of affect. I argue against the reasoning behind this proposal, and propose instead a new strategy for deciding what measure is appropriate.
Similar books and articles
Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers.Evan Thompson, A. Lutz & D. Cosmelli - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 40.
First-Person Data, Publicity and Self-Measurement.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-16.
Data from introspective reports: Upgrading from common sense to science.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):141-156.
De re and de se in quantified belief reports.Emar Maier - 2005 - In Sylvia Blaho, Luis Vicente & Erik Schoorlemmer (eds.), Proceedings of Console Xiii. pp. 211-29.
How to Improve on Heterophenomenology: The Self-Measurement Methodology of First-Person Data.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):3 - 4.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Old and New Problems in Philosophy of Measurement.Eran Tal - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1159-1173.
Measuring effectiveness.Jacob Stegenga - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 54:62-71.
What If Well-Being Measurements Are Non-Linear?Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):29-45.
References found in this work
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.