Philosophy of Science 75 (3):383-404 (2008)

Authors
Anna Alexandrova
Cambridge University
Abstract
What sort of claims do scientific models make and how do these claims then underwrite empirical successes such as explanations and reliable policy interventions? In this paper I propose answers to these questions for the class of models used throughout the social and biological sciences, namely idealized deductive ones with a causal interpretation. I argue that the two main existing accounts misrepresent how these models are actually used, and propose a new account. *Received July 2006; revised August 2008. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, St. Louis, 599 Lucas Hall (MC 73), One University Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63121-4400; e-mail: alexandrovaa@umsl.edu.
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DOI 10.1086/592952
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References found in this work BETA

The Scientific Image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - Oxford University Press.
Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach.Jeffrey S. Poland - 1988 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):653-656.

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Citations of this work BETA

Idealizations and Understanding: Much Ado About Nothing?Emily Sullivan & Kareem Khalifa - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):673-689.
The Explanation Paradox.Julian Reiss - 2012 - Journal of Economic Methodology 19 (1):43-62.

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