On the Thesis of a Necessary Connection between Law and Morality: Bulygin's Critique

Ratio Juris 13 (2):138-147 (2000)
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Abstract

In this article the author adduces a non‐positivist argument for a necessary connection between law and morality; the argument is based on the claim to correctness, and it is directed to an attack stemming from Eugenio Bulygin. The heart of the controversy is the claim to correctness. The author first attempts to show that there are good reasons for maintaining that law necessarily raises a claim to correctness. He argues, second, for the thesis that this claim has moral implications. Finally, he attempts to refute Bulygin's objection that the claim‐based argument for non‐positivism boils down to contradiction and triviality.

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Citations of this work

On the concept and the nature of law.Robert Alexy - 2008 - Ratio Juris 21 (3):281-299.
Legal Certainty and Correctness.Robert Alexy - 2015 - Ratio Juris 28 (4):441-451.
Law and moral justification.Andrea Faggion - 2020 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 61 (145):55-72.

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References found in this work

Law’s Normative Claims.Philip Soper - 1996 - In Robert P. George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism. Oxford University Press.

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