Preference-based belief revision for rule-based agents

Synthese 165 (2):159-177 (2008)
Authors
Mark Jago
Nottingham University
Abstract
Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent’s beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, we consider belief revision for agents which reason in a simpler logic than full first-order logic, namely rule-based reasoners. We show that it is possible to define a contraction operation for rule-based reasoners, which we call McAllester contraction, which satisfies all the basic Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) postulates for contraction (apart from the recovery postulate) and at the same time can be computed in polynomial time. We prove a representation theorem for McAllester contraction with respect to the basic AGM postulates (minus recovery), and two additional postulates. We then show that our contraction operation removes a set of beliefs which is least preferred, with respect to a natural interpretation of preference. Finally, we show how McAllester contraction can be used to define a revision operation which is also polynomial time, and prove a representation theorem for the revision operation.
Keywords Belief revision  Reason maintenance systems  Preferences  Rule-based agents
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9364-0
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References found in this work BETA

Belief Contraction Without Recovery.Sven Ove Hansson - 1991 - Studia Logica 50 (2):251 - 260.
On the Status of the Postulate of Recovery in the Logic of Theory Change.David Makinson - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (4):383 - 394.
Theory Contraction and Base Contraction Unified.Sven Ove Hansson - 1993 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 58 (2):602-625.

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