Reconsidering the Relationship among Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, and Negligence in Criminal Law
Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (2):84 (1990)
This essay, as will become obvious, owes a huge debt to Mark Kelman, particularly to his article “Interpretative Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law.” That debt is one of both concept and content. There is rich irony in my aping Kelman's deconstructionist enterprise, for I do not share his enthusiasm for either the “insights” or the political agenda of the Critical Legal Studies movement. I do not believe that either the law in general or the criminal law in particular is radically indeterminate, rife with internal contradictions, or an expression of the interests of a dominant economic class. And although, like Kelman, I believe that the freedom/determinism, act/character, and rule/principle dichotomies must ultimately be dealt with in order to have a completely satisfactory account of criminal law, I also believe that these dichotomies loom just as large in other areas of law and in normative theory generally. They are problems for Crits as well as for liberal-legalists. In any event, my intentions in undertaking this deconstructionist enterprise are modestly reformist, not revolutionary. I do not intend to shift any paradigms, but to work with well-established ones. I will assume that criminal law seeks to accomplish some blend of retributive response to and deterrence of culpable choices, choices to defy moral norms that are also legal norms. I will also assume that a culpable choice is one that reflects negatively on the values held by the chooser. Beyond these quite modest assumptions, I need not and will not venture in this paper, realizing, of course, that much has and can be written about the proper aims of punishment and the proper account of culpability
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
What Are Intoxicated Offenders Responsible For? The “Intoxication Defense” Re-Examined.Susan Dimock - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (1):1-20.
Against a Descriptive Vindication of Doxastic Voluntarism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
Voluntary Acts: The Child/Davidson Trilemma.Alexander Larry - 1992 - Criminal Justice Ethics 11 (2):98-99.
The Actus Reus Requirement: A Qualified Defense.Michael Gorr - 1991 - Criminal Justice Ethics 10 (1):11-17.
Similar books and articles
Responsibility and the Negligence Standard.Joseph Raz - 2010 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (1):1-18.
Negligence, Belief, Blame and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting. [REVIEW]Douglas Husak - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):199-218.
Is the Risk–Liability Theory Compatible with Negligence Law?Toby Handfield & Trevor Pisciotta - 2005 - Legal Theory 11 (4):387-404.
Understanding the Voluntary Act Principle.Andrew Botterell - 2012 - In François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos (eds.), Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law. Hart Publishing.
Time-Frames, Voluntary Acts, and Strict Liability.Douglas Husak & Brian P. McLaughlin - 1993 - Law and Philosophy 12 (1):95 - 120.
A. P. Simester (Ed): Appraising Strict Liability.Roger A. Shiner & Jeremy Hoemsen - 2006 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (1):119-122.
Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its Implications for Criminal Law.Michael S. Moore - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Added to index2010-08-31
Total downloads63 ( #83,278 of 2,170,072 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #345,514 of 2,170,072 )
How can I increase my downloads?