Similarity and the Trustworthiness of Distributive Judgments

Economics and Philosophy (forthcoming)
Authors
Alex Voorhoeve
London School of Economics
Abstract
When people must either save a greater number of people from a smaller harm or a smaller number from a greater harm, do their choices reflect a reasonable moral outlook? We pursue this question with the help of an experiment. In our experiment, two-fifths of subjects employ a similarity heuristic. When alternatives appear dissimilar in terms of the number saved but similar in terms of the magnitude of harm prevented, this heuristic mandates saving the greater number. In our experiment, this leads to choices that are inconsistent with all standard theories of justice. We argue that this demonstrates the untrustworthiness of distributive judgments in cases that elicit similarity-based choice.
Keywords Similarity  Decision-Making  Heuristics  Biases  Moral psychology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2018
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Automated Choice Heuristics.Shane Frederick - 2002 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 548-558.
Choice Output and Choice Processing: An Analogy to Similarity.Arthur B. Markman - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):423-424.
Reasons-Based Moral Judgment and the Erotetic Theory.Philipp Koralus & Mark Alfano - 2017 - In Jean-Francois Bonnefon & Bastian Tremoliere (eds.), Moral Inference.
Compensatory Ethics.Chen-Bo Zhong, Gillian Ku, Robert B. Lount & J. Keith Murnighan - 2010 - Journal of Business Ethics 92 (3):323-339.
How Neuroscience Can Vindicate Moral Intuition.Christopher Freiman - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1011-1025.
Taurek, Numbers and Probabilities.Rob Lawlor - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):149 - 166.
Similarity in Logical Reasoning and Decision-Making.Horacio Arló-Costa - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):14-15.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-01-14

Total views
67 ( #101,718 of 2,312,415 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #93,365 of 2,312,415 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature