The Argument From Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism

Oxford ;: Oxford University Press UK (2002)
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Abstract

At the heart of this book is the age-old question of how law and morality are related. The legal positivist, insisting on the separation of the two, explicates the concept of law independently of morality. The author challenges this view, arguing that there are, first, conceptually necessary connections between law and morality and, second, normative reasons for including moral elements in the concept of law. While the conceptual argument alone is too limited to establish a sufficiently strong connection between law and morality, and the normative argument alone fails to address the nature of law, the two arguments together support a nonpositivistic concept of law, toppling legal positivism qua comprehensive theory of law.

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Citations of this work

Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory.Stephen Finlay & David Plunkett - 2018 - In John Gardner, Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, vol. 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 49-86.
The dual nature of law.Robert Alexy - 2010 - Ratio Juris 23 (2):167-182.
On the concept and the nature of law.Robert Alexy - 2008 - Ratio Juris 21 (3):281-299.
Legal Certainty and Correctness.Robert Alexy - 2015 - Ratio Juris 28 (4):441-451.

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