The dual nature of law

Ratio Juris 23 (2):167-182 (2010)
The argument of this article is that the dual-nature thesis is not only capable of solving the problem of legal positivism, but also addresses all fundamental questions of law. Examples are the relation between deliberative democracy and democracy qua decision-making procedure along the lines of the majority principle, the connection between human rights as moral rights and constitutional rights as positive rights, the relation between constitutional review qua ideal representation of the people and parliamentary legislation, the commitment of legal argumentation to both authoritative and non-authoritative reasons, and the distinction between rules as expressing a real “ought” and principles as expressing its ideal counterpart. All of this underscores the point that the dual nature of law is the single most essential feature of law
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2010.00449.x
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References found in this work BETA
Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.
Natural Law and Natural Rights.John Finnis - 1979 - Oxford University Press.

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Legal Certainty and Correctness.Robert Alexy - 2015 - Ratio Juris 28 (4):441-451.
Natural Law Theories.Jonathan Crowe - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (2):91-101.

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