La visión pragmatista de C.S. Peirce sobre la aserción


Authors
Jaime Alfaro Iglesias
Universidade de São Paulo
Abstract
C.S. Peirce defended a pragmatist view of assertion in terms of its normative effect. This paper has two goals. First, to reconstruct and assess Peirce’s argument for the thesis that to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth. Second, to argue that Peirce interpreted “responsibility for truth” as the acquisition of a dialogical commitment, namely, the duty to defend the proposition asserted by giving reasons upon challenge.
Keywords Assertion  Pragmatism  Dialogical Semantics  C.S. Peirce  Commitment View of Assertion
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Erkenntnis 44 (1):119-123.
What Is Assertion?John MacFarlane - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion. Oxford University Press.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Rascals, Triflers, and Pragmatists: Developing a Peircean Account of Assertion.Kenneth Boyd & Diana Heney - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (2):1-22.
Normative Accounts of Assertion: From Peirce to Williamson and Back Again.Neri Marsili - 2015 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio:112-130.
Reality as Necessary Friction.Diana B. Heney - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (9):504-514.
Peirce, Pragmatism, and Philosophical Style.Christopher Hookway - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:325-337.
Peirce, Pragmatism, and Philosophical Style.Christopher Hookway - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:325-337.
Hookway's Peirce on Assertion & Truth. Howat - 2015 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 51 (4):419.
C. S. Peirce: Pragmatism and Logicism.Jaime Nubiola - 1996 - Philosophia Scientiae 1 (2):109-119.
Peirce on Inquiry and Truth.Thomas Edward Keith - 2001 - Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-07-27

Total views
105 ( #72,354 of 2,250,031 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
55 ( #11,645 of 2,250,031 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature