Synthese 194 (5) (2017)

Authors
Dominic Alford-Duguid
Oxford University
Michael Arsenault
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
Pautz has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.
Keywords Mind  Perception  Intentionalism  Naive realism  Hallucination  Acquaintance  Thought
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1020-5
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Properties in sight and in thought.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2019 - Synthese 198 (8):7049-7071.

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