Thought about Properties: Why the Perceptual Case is Basic

Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):221-242 (2018)

Authors
Dominic Alford-Duguid
Oxford University
Abstract
This paper defends a version of the old empiricist claim that to think about unobservable physical properties a subject must be able to think perception-based thoughts about observable properties. The central argument builds upon foundations laid down by G. E. M. Anscombe and P. F. Strawson. It bridges the gap separating these foundations and the target claim by exploiting a neglected connection between thought about properties and our grasp of causation. This way of bridging the gap promises to introduce substantive constraints on right accounts of perception and perception-based thought.
Keywords Demonstrative Thought  Causation  Properties  Perception  Anscombe  P. F. Strawson  Generality Constraint  Logical Atomism
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqx042
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Causation as Influence.David K. Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony, Gareth Evans & John McDowell - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

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