Journal of Nietzsche Studies 40 (1):29-46 (2010)
AbstractI have argued elsewhere that the psychological aspects of Nietzsche’s later works are best understood from a psychodynamic point of view. Nietzsche holds a view I dubbed the tenacity of the intentional (T): when an intentional state loses its object, a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely. In this essay I amend and clarify (T) to (T``): When an intentional state with a sub-propositional object loses its object, the affective component of the state persists without a corresponding object, and that affect will generally be redeployed in a state with a distinct object. I then trace the development of the tenacity thesis through Nietzsche’s early and middle works. Along the way, I discuss a number of related topics, including the scope of the tenacity thesis (does it apply to all intentional states?), the reflexive turn one often finds in Nietzsche’s examples (why does he so often say the new object is oneself?), and the relations among will to power, drives, and the tenacity of the intentional.
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Citations of this work
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The Nietzschean Precedent for Anti-Reflective, Dialogical Agency.Alfano Mark - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
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References found in this work
Standing Up for an Affective Account of Emotion.Demian Whiting - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.
Objectless Emotions.Roger Lamb - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (September):107-117.
Nietzsche's Post-Positivism.Maudemarie Clark & David Dudrick - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):369-385.