The Tenacity of the Intentional Prior to the Genealogy

Journal of Nietzsche Studies 40 (1):29-46 (2010)
Abstract
I have argued elsewhere that the psychological aspects of Nietzsche’s later works are best understood from a psychodynamic point of view. Nietzsche holds a view I dubbed the tenacity of the intentional (T): when an intentional state loses its object, a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely. In this essay I amend and clarify (T) to (T``): When an intentional state with a sub-propositional object loses its object, the affective component of the state persists without a corresponding object, and that affect will generally be redeployed in a state with a distinct object. I then trace the development of the tenacity thesis through Nietzsche’s early and middle works. Along the way, I discuss a number of related topics, including the scope of the tenacity thesis (does it apply to all intentional states?), the reflexive turn one often finds in Nietzsche’s examples (why does he so often say the new object is oneself?), and the relations among will to power, drives, and the tenacity of the intentional.
Keywords tenacity of the intentional  drives  will to power  intentionality  affects
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DOI 10.5325/jnietstud.1.40.0029
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References found in this work BETA
Nietzsche's Positivism.Nadeem J. Z. Hussain - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):326–368.
Standing Up for an Affective Account of Emotion.Demian Whiting - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.
Nietzsche's Post-Positivism.Maudemarie Clark & David Dudrick - 2004 - European Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):369-385.
Objectless Emotions.Roger E. Lamb - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (September):107-117.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Most Agreeable of All Vices: Nietzsche as Virtue Epistemologist.Mark Alfano - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (4):767-790.

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