Revaluing the behaviorist ghost in enactivism and embodied cognition

Synthese 198 (6):5785-5807 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Despite its short historical moment in the sun, behaviorism has become something akin to a theoria non grata, a position that dare not be explicitly endorsed. The reasons for this are complex, of course, and they include sociological factors which we cannot consider here, but to put it briefly: many have doubted the ambition to establish law-like relationships between mental states and behavior that dispense with any sort of mentalistic or intentional idiom, judging that explanations of intelligent behavior require reference to qualia and/or mental events. Today, when behaviorism is discussed at all, it is usually in a negative manner, either as an attempt to discredit an opponent’s view via a reductio, or by enabling a position to distinguish its identity and positive claims by reference to what it is (allegedly) not. In this paper, however, we argue that the ghost of behaviorism is present in influential, contemporary work in the field of embodied and enactive cognition, and even in aspects of the phenomenological tradition that these theorists draw on. Rather than take this to be a problem for these views as some have, we argue that once the behaviorist dimensions are clarified and distinguished from the straw-man version of the view, it is in fact an asset, one which will help with task of setting forth a scientifically reputable version of enactivism and/or philosophical behaviorism that is nonetheless not brain-centric but behavior-centric. While this is a bit like “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” strategy, as Shaun Gallagher notes (2019), with the shared enemy of behaviorism and enactivism being classical Cartesian views and/or orthodox cognitivism in its various guises, the task of this paper is to render this alliance philosophically plausible. Doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02432-1

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Cognition and behavior.Ken Aizawa - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4269-4288.
Can the mind be embodied, enactive, affective, a nd extended?Michelle Maiese - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):343-361.
Cognition as shaking hands with the world. Introduction.Przemyslaw Nowakowski & Tomasz Komendzinski - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):11-16.
Locked-in syndrome: a challenge for embodied cognitive science.Miriam Kyselo & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):517-542.
Non-representationalist cognitive science and realism.Karim Zahidi - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):461-475.
Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition.Richard Menary - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):459-463.
Dynamic Embodied Cognition.Leon C. de Bruin & Lena Kästner - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.
The Enactivist Revolution.Kenneth Aizawa - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):19-42.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-10-13

Downloads
1,481 (#7,306)

6 months
296 (#7,299)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Nikolai Alksnis
La Trobe University
Jack Alan Reynolds
Deakin University

References found in this work

Phenomenology of perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1945 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press. Edited by Donald A. Landes.
Ontological relativity and other essays.Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.) - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind.Evan Thompson - 2007 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Donald A. Landes.

View all 74 references / Add more references