A Classical Prejudice?

Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (1):25-40 (2010)
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Abstract

In this paper I reassess Floridi's solution to the Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox (the information-yield of inconsistent propositions is maximal) by questioning the orthodox view that contradictions cannot be true. The main part of the paper is devoted to showing that the veridicality thesis (semantic information has to be true) is compatible with dialetheism (there are true contradictions), and that unless we accept the additional non-falsity thesis (information cannot be false) there is no reason to presuppose that there is no such thing like contradictory information.

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2012-07-19

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Patrick Allo
Vrije Universiteit Brussel

References found in this work

In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Philosophy of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Edited by Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons.
Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Saving truth from paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.

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