Blur

Philosophical Studies 162 (2):257-273 (2013)
Abstract
This paper presents an ‘over-representational’ account of blurred visual experiences. The basic idea is that blurred experiences provide too much, inconsistent, information about objects’ spatial boundaries, by representing them as simultaneously located at multiple locations. This account attempts to avoid problems with alternative accounts of blurred experience, according to which blur is a property of a visual field, a way of perceiving, a form of mis-representation, and a form of under-representation.
Keywords Blurred vision  Perception  Transparency  Intentionalism  Representationalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9758-6
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References found in this work BETA
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 4 (4):376-425.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Object View of Perception.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):215-227.
Blur and Perceptual Content.Bence Nanay - forthcoming - Analysis:anx119.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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