Concept attribution in nonhuman animals: Theoretical and methodological problems in ascribing complex mental processes

Philosophy of Science 58 (2):221-240 (1991)
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Abstract

The demise of behaviorism has made ethologists more willing to ascribe mental states to animals. However, a methodology that can avoid the charge of excessive anthropomorphism is needed. We describe a series of experiments that could help determine whether the behavior of nonhuman animals towards dead conspecifics is concept mediated. These experiments form the basis of a general point. The behavior of some animals is clearly guided by complex mental processes. The techniques developed by comparative psychologists and behavioral ecologists are able to provide us with the tools to critically evaluate hypotheses concerning the continuity between human minds and animal minds

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Colin Allen
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus‐Independence.Elisabeth Camp - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):275-311.
Animal minds and the possession of concepts.Albert Newen & Andreas Bartels - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):283 – 308.
A blooming and buzzing confusion: Buffon, Reimarus, and Kant on animal cognition.Hein van den Berg - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 72:1-9.
Do Animals Engage in Conceptual Thought?Jacob Beck - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (3):218-229.

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References found in this work

Meaning.Herbert Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
Content and Consciousness.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1969 - New York,: Humanities P..
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.

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