Cognitive ethology and the intentionality of animal behavior

Mind and Language 10 (4):313-328 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Cognitive ethologists are in need of a good theoretical framework for attributing intentional states. Heyes and Dickinson (1990) present criteria that they claim are necessary for an intentional explanation of behavior to be justified. They suggest that questions of intentionality can only be investigated under controlled laboratory conditions and they apply their criteria to laboratory experiments to argue that the common behavior of approaching food is not intentional in most animals. We dispute the details of their argument and interpretation of the laboratory experiments. While criteria such as those suggested have a role to play in comparative studies of cognition, both laboratory and field studies are important for assessing the applicability of intentional explanations across different taxa.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,213

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

158 (#100,982)

6 months
5 (#191,006)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Colin Allen
University of Pittsburgh