Classical logic, conditionals and “nonmonotonic” reasoning

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):85-85 (2009)
Abstract
Reasoning with conditionals is often thought to be non-monotonic, but there is no incompatibility with classical logic, and no need to formalise inference itself as probabilistic. When the addition of a new premise leads to abandonment of a previously compelling conclusion reached by modus ponens, for example, this is generally because it is hard to think of a model in which the conditional and the new premise are true
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X09000296
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