Philosophies 2 (2) (2017)

Sean Allen-Hermanson
Florida International University
This paper offers an unorthodox appraisal of empirical research bearing on the question of the low representation of women in philosophy. It contends that fashionable views in the profession concerning implicit bias and stereotype threat are weakly supported, that philosophers often fail to report the empirical work responsibly, and that the standards for evidence are set very low—so long as you take a certain viewpoint.
Keywords implicit bias  stereotypye threat  gender bias  sexism  underrepresentation of women  sexism  blind auditions  unconscious bias  political correctness  replication crisis
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Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality.Stacey Goguen - 2016 - In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-237.
Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd - 2012 - Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):274-306.


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