Philosophical Studies 142 (2):197 - 220 (2009)

Authors
Keith Allen
University of York
Abstract
Inter-species variation in colour perception poses a serious problem for the view that colours are mind-independent properties. Given that colour perception varies so drastically across species, which species perceives colours as they really are? In this paper, I argue that all do. Specifically, I argue that members of different species perceive properties that are determinates of different, mutually compatible, determinables. This is an instance of a general selectionist strategy for dealing with cases of perceptual variation. According to selectionist views, objects simultaneously instantiate a plurality of colours, all of them genuinely mind-independent, and subjects select from amongst this plurality which colours they perceive. I contrast selectionist views with relationalist views that deny the mind-independence of colour, and consider some general objections to this strategy
Keywords color   pluralism   shifted spectrum
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Reprint years 2009
DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9183-z
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References found in this work BETA

Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Sameness and Substance Renewed.David Wiggins - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
Perception.H. H. Price - 1932 - Methuen & Co..

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Citations of this work BETA

Color Pluralism.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):563-601.
Color Illusion.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):751-775.
The Multiply Qualitative.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):239-262.
Another Look at Color Primitivism.Pendaran Roberts - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2489-2506.

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